Connect with your Facebook Account

Contact

35

College Baseball and Manufacturing Runs

Posted by Huckleberry on March 11th, 2009 under Baseball

Having followed Longhorn baseball for most of our lives, nearly all of us are familiar with the traditional Texas approach to scoring runs. There seems to exist a segment of the fanbase that frowns upon power in a baseball lineup and will always yearn for smallball as their style of choice. Some of that is certainly based on a tendency to want to stay in your comfort zone, some of it is probably based on the ridiculous brand of 1990s “baseball” known as gorilla ball perfected by the LSU Tigers.

Regardless of each individual’s motivation, it’s hard to argue against the notion that the Texas fanbase overall is very hostile to the idea of Earl Weaver baseball at Disch-Falk. What I take issue with, though, is the idea that just because Disch-Falk is a pitcher’s park (although not as extreme as most Texas fans believe) that necessarily means bunting is generally a good idea. It’s no secret that I’m not a big fan of bunting in nearly any situation, although I’m very much in favor of the safety squeeze in situations where a single run is called for as long as the players are competent at its execution. Outs are an offense’s most precious commodity in the game of baseball and giving them away should therefore cause a pain in your gut. It’s true that college defenses are not nearly as precise as their professional counterparts, but I have always found it hard to believe that the difference there is enough to offset the proven wrongness, on the major league level, of bunting in most situations.

National Statistics

The phenomenal Boyd Nation has put together an expected runs table for college baseball based on the outs/runners situation for the years 2005-2008. It’s obviously important to keep certain things in mind when reviewing the table, such as park factors, team lineup, etc. However, that shouldn’t stop us from being able to draw general conclusions related to college baseball. Take a moment to review the table and then we’ll look at possible bunting situations, both likely and unlikely, and what the numbers say.

(Information below is formatted as follows: Situation – Expected runs in the inning, % of innings scoring at least one run, Expected runs after successful bunt, % of innings scoring at least one run after successful bunt)

Runner on 1st, 0 outs – 1.10, 52, 0.84, 48
Runner on 1st, 1 out – 0.65, 34, 0.39, 27
Runner on 2nd, 0 outs – 1.39, 69, 1.08, 70
Runner on 2nd, 1 out – 0.84, 48, 0.44, 31
Runners on 1st and 2nd, 0 outs – 1.83, 72, 1.59, 75
Runners on 1st and 2nd, 1 out – 1.16, 51, 0.73, 35
Runners on 1st and 3rd, 0 outs (bunt to 2nd and 3rd) – 2.07, 89, 1.59, 75
Runners on 1st and 3rd, 1 outs (bunt to 2nd and 3rd) – 1.40, 71, 0.73, 35

So, based on the view from 30,000 feet, the only situations in which the numbers say bunting makes sense are those with a runner on second base and nobody out – but only if the game situation suggests that you need to do everything you can to score at least one run because even then your expected value in runs for the full inning goes down. Essentially, the only time the numbers say you should bunt if you’re an average team in an average park is when you are tied or down by one run and you have a runner on second base (whether or not someone is on first) and nobody out late in the ballgame. And if you don’t have a pitching staff you trust a whole lot, it should probably be the bottom of the ninth inning. Even in these situations, the numbers aren’t very convincing as the percentage goes up from 69% to 70% in one and from 72% to 75% in the other. Another thing to keep in mind about these numbers is that the expected runs values are slightly depressed by game-ending scores, although that effect is likely negligible.

The data also tells us is that even in the best-case scenario for bunting from the EV(runs) perspective, bunting a runner or two over will cost your team 1/4 of a run on average. And that’s only if the sacrifice is successful. Finally, this analysis slightly depresses the disparities in any particular situational perspective. This is because, for example, the runner on 1st with no outs number includes the runner on 2nd with 1 out situations caused by sacrifice bunts, which we know score at a lower rate than the former situation.

The other aspect of offense that these numbers allow us to review is the stolen base. Using the same table and accounting for both successful and failed stolen base attempts, we can determine the break-even point for each situation. This point represents the success rate that a runner must have in order to make the attempt worthwhile. Note that this assumes no impact on the current at-bat (i.e., assumed to occur early enough in the count not to affect the pitcher/batter matchup).

(Situation – Required success rate to increase EV(runs), Required success rate to increase % chance of scoring at least one run)

Runner on 1st, 0 outs – 72.9%, 66.7%
Runner on 1st, 1 out – 74.0%, 65.9%
Runner on 1st, 2 out – 71.8%, 63.0%
Runner on 2nd, 0 outs – 82.3%, 76.1%
Runner on 2nd, 1 out – 75.3%, 65.1%
Runner on 2nd, 2 out – 88.6%, 87.1%
Runners on 1st and 2nd, 0 outs (double steal – assume lead runner caught if unsuccessful) – 66.9%, 57.1%
Runners on 1st and 2nd, 1 out (double steal – assume lead runner caught if unsuccessful) – 64.2%, 50.0%
Runners on 1st and 2nd, 2 out (double steal) – 78.1%, 85.7%
Runners on 1st and 2nd, 0 outs (lead runner only) – 83.1%, 69.1%
Runners on 1st and 2nd, 1 out (lead runner only) – 78.6%, 63.0%
Runners on 1st and 2nd, 2 out (lead runner only) – 87.7%, 83.3%
Runners on 1st and 3rd, 0 outs (steal 2nd) – 83.1%, 97.6%
Runners on 1st and 3rd, 1 outs (steal 2nd) – 84.2%, 89.0%
Runners on 1st and 3rd, 2 outs (steal 2nd) – 89.0%, 102.9%

For reference, Texas had a stolen base success rate of 75.3% last year.

Here we can see one particular piece of conventional wisdom confirmed – never make the first or third out at third base. The only time it makes sense for even a decent base-stealer to attempt to swipe third base is with one out. No surprise there. Of course, we can also spot an anomaly in the data where the table says that at least one run is scored more often in a 1st and 3rd with 2 outs situation than in a 2nd and 3rd with 2 outs situation. I’m not sure why that would be, but there’s a lot of data behind it. Perhaps not enough to make it more than a fluke, though. The only thing I can come up with is that opposing coaches are more willing to issue the intentional walk in a 2nd and 3rd situation that creates force plays at 3rd and home, enabling more escapes without any runs scored but increasing the average number of runs allowed for the remainder of the inning.

The other thing I noticed immediately is that the double steal is the best stolen base strategy available. The ideal stolen base attempt is a double steal with 1 out in the inning.

2008 Texas Longhorn Statistics

But what about our particular team and park? Well, I’m not as good to you as Boyd Nation is to us all, so I only looked at the 2008 numbers for Texas from the box scores still available on texassports.com as of today. Yes, I went through each game’s play-by-play. The data:

EV(runs)
Outs–> 0 1 2
Empty 0.92 0.58 0.24
1st 1.35 0.96 0.43
2nd 1.44 1.12 0.51
1st and 2nd 2.10 1.68 0.73
3rd 1.50 1.33 0.53
1st and 3rd 1.38 1.60 0.85
2nd and 3rd 1.70 3.38 1.35
Loaded 2.56 2.37 2.07
% Score
Outs–> 0 1 2
Empty 41% 27% 14%
1st 59% 38% 19%
2nd 64% 56% 33%
1st and 2nd 77% 67% 39%
3rd 100% 67% 25%
1st and 3rd 75% 70% 36%
2nd and 3rd 100% 88% 48%
Loaded 78% 79% 70%

I’m not going to repeat the full analyses above, but the basic lesson is the same. A couple of notes about our particular results last year are that our team struggled in situations with a runner on third and two outs and performed far better than the norm in situations with runners on 2nd and 3rd and one out. Nevertheless, the important thing is that our team, just like the national average, scored more runs per inning and scored at least one run more often in runner on 1st and no outs situations than they did in runner on second and one out situations. Also like the national average, we gave up about 1/4 of a run each time we bunted that runner over and decreased our likelihood of scoring even a single run by 3-4%. The number of data points for some situations isn’t sufficient for final conclusions, but the trends indicate that the national averages above can serve as a good measuring stick for situational decision-making. Our numbers were, of course, higher than the national average in most scenarios, but the relationship between the numbers is similar.

In summary, STOP BUNTING AUGIE!

Thoughts?

More from this Barker


Share This

  • StumbleUpon

35 Responses

  1. Great article, but it’ll never happen with Augie at the helm.

    Hook ‘em!

  2. The Gut of Every Potbellied Baseball Manager Ever said:

    March 11th, 2009 at 12:03 pm

    But he listens to me, not you, wise ass.

    So there.

  3. Been saying this for years. Advice: prepare for the small ball crew to ignore the numbers and argue with you anyway.

  4. Also: good post. Can’t be said enough.

  5. Beaten dead horse said:

    March 11th, 2009 at 12:46 pm

    Not having coached above aged 16, I can’t speak for college but I always based bunting strategy on my pitching staff’s ability. Which predicated my game strategy. If I could win 3-1, I’m bunting. If it’s going to be 6-5, I’m swinging.

  6. Bdh -

    I assume that the lower the level, the better idea bunting becomes because of defensive ability of your opponents.

    However, your logic above still doesn’t work with the numbers shown here. It seems like you based that idea, which is common, on the belief that bunting will lead to a lower variance but with a higher likelihood of scoring at least one run. What the data shows, though, is that not only do you decrease the likelihood of a big inning, but you also decrease the likelihood of scoring at least the one run.

  7. Stats Are For Losers said:

    March 11th, 2009 at 1:18 pm

    Why are people focusing on pitching level as the predicator to bunting. That seems bass ackwards.

    It would seem to me that you would bunt when your team is woefully bad at hitting.

    I am of the opinion that with a runner on second ( zero or one out) you should tell your hitter to swing for the fences. If he can put a ball on the warning track that is going to at very least advance the runner. Possibly score?

    Bunting as a philosophy indicates that your team has a lineup riddled with people that can not put a ball to the warning track.

    Is that what UT has?

  8. The Gut of Every Potbellied Baseball Manager Ever said:

    March 11th, 2009 at 1:41 pm

    And, he just gave me three cheeseburgers and nine Jack and Cokes.

    So: he may flirt with statistics, but he comes home to me.

  9. It’s really hard to get worked up over the unnecessary bunting. Every time the words poor Longhorn strategery roll through my mind I get a mental picture of Greg Davis calling a sideways running play for Cody Johnson.

    Then I black out.

  10. BUT, BUT….YOU MUST MANUFACTURE RUNS!

    This is a really good post and it reinforces one of my biggest revelations reading Moneyball: managers bunt because most managers are the basically shamans when it comes to studying the game of baseball – everything is about tradition, superstition, precedent.

    There’s also an amusing mythology around smallballers: that they are cleverer sorts; “thinking managers”; they really understand the game’s ins and outs instead of the foolish manager who tells his big bat to swing for the fences with a man on first.

    Man, I’ve been waiting for you to opine on the baseball team and it’s a treat to see you do so.
    Keep it coming.

    I hope our pitching continues to be so dominant that it renders this point moot.

  11. National Champions 2002,2005. 5 trips to the College World Series in last 8 years, 4 Big 12 Conference Championships in last 12 years, 2 Conference Tournament Championships, Garrido has 5 National Championship Rings and more wins than any other Dl Coach. The University has 6 National Championships. Find a place for those stats.

  12. Something tells me you’re either not a performance optimization expert or else you were a performance optimization expert for Bear Stearns.

    I mean, who would possibly want to look at ways to get better if you’re already good? What sense does that make?

  13. For those interested, the schedule graph of Division 1 baseball teams is now connected, so I have released my ratings for this season. As always, all my ratings are available here.

  14. Gate_of_Horn said:

    March 11th, 2009 at 10:49 pm

    First point – Barking Carnival should compile a reading list and post it. There is enough reference material alluded to here that I’m interested to pick up some of it. It would help if there was a list to keep it straight.

    Next point – I am trying to connect a pro-smallball argument I heard once to the logic presented in this post. I wanted to see how it’s premise related to the ideas above. The argument went something like this:

    Smallball capitalizes on an emotional weakness. It’s not built for creating a lead, but rather for exploiting a tie score or a currently held lead. In those situations, the other team will start to feel pressure. Pressure to avoid error, score, manage time, etc. Pros are not as strongly affected by that pressure individually. As a group, pros suffer it with less variance than college athletes, and college less than high school, etc. Smallball increases the number of balls in play. Therefore, if a college athlete has a one in three chance of making an unforced error, why not make sure you put three balls in play and force him to do it without mistakes? Moreover, if that college player’s chances of making an unforced error go up to .5 when he’s down a point in the CWS, why not put those same three balls in play, since the payoff is larger?

    It seems like Powerball is about playing to your own abilities, whereas smallball is playing to an opponents limitations. When I heard the argument, it seemed that a tie or lead situation was an important assumption. I don’t recall a claim made that it was a good way to play from behind.

  15. Bob in Houston said:

    March 12th, 2009 at 3:38 am

    Gus and Augie set collegiate win records by bunting. Huck, do you think these are anomalies, or did they just recruit better players?

  16. I don’t think they’re anomalies. They had/have better players (notice how our relatively poor 2008 team still scored way above average both in terms of average runs in most situations as well as scoring percentage). They also had/have better pitching and defense than nearly all teams every year. Being in the top 5 in preventing opponents’ runs will cover up a lot of weakness on offense.

    Also, the above evidence would not apply to all eras. Back when there were significantly fewer extra base hits, the analysis would probably shift to where bunting made more sense. But managing a baseball game the same now as you did in the early 1980s doesn’t make sense from a maximizing offensive production perspective.

    Gate -

    Regardless of the arguments, one would expect the “favorable” situation created by the strategy to yield higher production, or at the very least equal production. I will go back through the 2008 Texas data specifically for runner on 1st and nobody out situations. I can even adjust for situations where we were in the lead, tied, or down one run versus all others.

  17. Another way of looking at it is this. Obviously scoring runs is only half the game. Preventing runs is the equally important other half.

    Using the fact that Texas had 129 runner on 1st and nobody out situations last year, if we never bunted, we can estimate that we would have scored 174 runs in those situations. We can also estimate that if we successfully sacrificed every single time, those 129 runner on 2nd with 1 out situations would have yielded 145 runs. We scored a total of 636 runs last year, so let’s just say that we can add that 29-run difference to the bottom line. These numbers are a hair off for the same reason discussed above where the former statistic includes sacrifice bunt situations, but they’re close enough for government work. Basically, they’re within a few trillion of the correct answer.

    Even in this extreme situation, the strategy of never bunting versus always bunting yields a 4.6% improvement in offensive output. Therefore, roughly a 2.3% improvement in team performance overall.

    2.3% worth of improvement isn’t going to make a bad coach good. But it can be the difference in a handful of games every year between equally matched teams, and that’s what matters. You should always look to maximize your expected performance.

  18. BatesHorn said:

    March 12th, 2009 at 7:06 am

    Thanks, Huck, for continuing to spread this message. I’ve been a believer in this stop bunting movement (along with the stop stealing bases unless your exceptionally good at it) movements since I stumbled onto my first Baseball Prospectus article (back when they were free). The more people hear this, the more it will penatrate to every level of baseball. Please keep hammering away.

    Bob-They won for a variety of reasons, but the math on this is irrefutable. Bunting almost NEVER works in the offenses advantage. Please reread the article and pay attention to the math.

    Pitching, Defense, and the Three Run Homer.

  19. Bob in Houston said:

    March 12th, 2009 at 7:15 am

    Bates, I understand the math. I agree with the premise. I think there are reasons to bunt if you need a run, such as to stay out of double play.

    But I was asking a broader question, which was, if bunting is such a bad idea, why did Gus and Augie win so much?

  20. BatesHorn said:

    March 12th, 2009 at 7:19 am

    Calvin Schiraldi, Burt Hooten, Roger Clemens, Brooks Kieschnik, Huston Street, etc.

    They won for many reasons, despite their devotion to small ball (and to be fair, I have no idea if Gus did a lot of small ball or not).

  21. Bornahorn said:

    March 12th, 2009 at 7:19 am

    Huck – do the figures take into account failed bunt attempts, i.e., bunts put down which result in the runner on first being forced at second or the runner on second being put out at third?

    Or where the batter, having burned two strikes on failed bunt attmepts, strikes out or otherwise makes an out without advancing the runner?

  22. Bornahorn said:

    March 12th, 2009 at 7:21 am

    Well, I guess that I understand that it only takes into account successful bunt attempts.

    A failed bunt attempt is like a wasted at bat and often ruins a half inning.

  23. La Cosa Nostradamus said:

    March 12th, 2009 at 7:31 am

    Your analysis doesn’t take into account whether or not the bunting team won the game. How can you measure the success of the strategy without that? The goal is not to bunt–the goal is to win. You’re only measuring the success of the individual bunt, not the success of the strategy.

    It’s sort of like saying a drug cures cancer 100% of the time, but not checking to see if it kills the patient.

  24. I’m not sure how one would take into account who won the game. And I’m really not sure it would be a reasonable thing to do given the fact that pitching and defense are half-responsible for every game outcome.

    The numbers speak for themselves. Bunting leads to fewer runs and more scoreless innings. The direct relationship between those events and fewer wins should be obvious even if it’s not quantified.

  25. “and to be fair, I have no idea if Gus did a lot of small ball or not”

    Gus was considered a small ball guy (or Gusball as it was termed), but he is nowhere near as aggressively small ball as Augie is.

    Augie takes it to an extreme.

  26. Bornahorn -

    The figures in the main post take that into account. The figures in my example in the comments section do not. Using the numbers in the main post for Texas in 2008, we see that a failed sacrifice with a runner on first took us from 1.35 runs per inning and a 59% scoring percentage to 0.96 runs per inning and a 38% scoring percentage (versus 1.12 and 56% for a successful attempt). So a successful bunt hurt us, but a failed attempt obviously hurt worse.

    If a player attempted a sacrifice bunt in that situation, failing to execute cost us an additional 0.16 runs per attempt and 18% in scoring percentage. What that tells me is that a player that failed to execute a sacrifice bunt actually cost us fewer runs (0.16 fewer runs on average than a successful attempt) than were cost by calling for the sacrifice bunt in the first place (0.23 fewer runs on average for a successful attempt than no attempt). Their failed attempt did, however, lower the scoring percentage by more than the bunt call (18% versus 3%).

  27. Parlin Hall said:

    March 12th, 2009 at 11:06 am

    The numbers absolutely support your overall strategy, HJ, but I wonder if you would make an exception for a particularly effective bunter (i.e. accurate and fast).

    They don’t come around so often, but if you have someone who can “steal” a hit like this, it could be seen as advantageous (as Gate_of_Horn suggests, above) to increase the complexity of the situation for the defense.

    Of course, all this depends on having a great bunter, and I’m guessing that that group heavily overlaps with those who can hit for percentages. Thanks for the post, by the way, and for following up these queries with further research.

  28. Both HenryJames and I would agree that calling me “HJ” is an insult, but only I would be correct about which one of us is being insulted.

    Thanks for the thoughts, though. Having a player that can bunt for a hit is a different situation altogether, of course, and is hard to quantify in a study like this. If we had any players attempting to bunt for a hit in the runner on 1st and no out situation I’m researching now, it will simply show up as a sacrifice bunt. I am counting the few bunts where the batter reached base as sacrifice attempts. This should theoretically help the bunting strategy in the study.

  29. BatesHorn said:

    March 13th, 2009 at 6:52 am

    It’s rare to find a player that can consistently bunt to hit, although they exist. Jose Reyes, Otis Nixon in his prime coke years, etc.

    Oddly enough, although not a classic bunt, Ichiro essentially lived, until recently, off the swinging bunt. Parlin raises a good point, with a player like young Ichiro at the plate, you can small ball very effectively.

  30. Gallo1515 said:

    April 17th, 2009 at 8:35 am

    Keep writing and let Augie keep winning national championships.

  31. Facebook User said:

    April 17th, 2009 at 8:52 am

    Gallo – Come on. You can do better than that. Is it possible he could win more national championships? Is that a fair goal?

  32. PatronSaint said:

    April 17th, 2009 at 10:29 am

    I’m undecided about this, but here are some thoughts.

    1) Because this is all imperical data and not the result of some equation, is it possible that the results are skewed by the very situations that drive one to bunt in the first place? For instance, let’s say Augie can see the Matrix and knows that his batter in a particular situation has a 30% chance of getting a hit, but in this particular situation, only has a 20% chance of getting a hit. Therefore the cost of ordering a bunt goes down, but only the higher percentage is reflected in the stats above because those are the situations in which he actually swings away.

    2) Is there an increased likelihood for an error fielding a bunt over a batted ball?

    3) Does equating the numbers above to the specific that UT shouldn’t be bunting fail to take into account that most teams don’t practice bunting nearly as much as we do?

  33. I just wonder why we seem to be such a great 2 out team? How many years have we seen us put up crooked numbers after only having 1 out left in an inning?

    I think it is because for the most part bunts are off. Many times this happens when no one has reached base and there are 2 outs. You see the hitters stop bunting and swinging for gaps and we seem to produce.

    Correct me if I’m wrong on this, but doesn’t our proficiency as a 2 out team mean we should not bunt as much? I mean, stats are cool (or for losers if you Coach Boom) but I think it is as simple as seeing how much we frustrate teams by scoring buttloads of runs with 2 outs.

  34. Microhorn said:

    April 19th, 2009 at 1:16 pm

    Good stats. Since the usual object of bunting is to move a runner into scoring position, another way to evaluate the rationale for bunting is to compare it to the alternative, which is the steal. The result is the same, but the advantage of the steal is that you don’t automatically give up an out. I’d like to know the percentage of successful steals vs the percentage of successful bunts. The relative percentages are not directly equivalent either, because of the surrendered out. Buntophiles should also understand that bunt attempts are not always successful, and even if a bunt is laid down, the runner on first doesn’t always reach second. There’s another factor too, what if the hitter swings away with a man on first. If he gets a single, there’s a good chance the runner on first makes it to third.

  35. Lone Star said:

    June 7th, 2009 at 3:59 pm

    Augie is a genius. The team that takes the lead in a college game wins 85% of the time. The team that continues to increase their lead wins 100% of the time. Augie bunts to take the lead and to increase his lead. There isn’t a college program in America who wouldn’t kill for an .850 winning percentage. Those are the only numbers that should matter in this debate.

Leave a Reply

Related Articles

Activity

  • Blake Stansbery commented on the blog post Recruiting the Trenches   ago

    I like my wine in a box…. I like my wine in a box GIIIRL

    SHARETHIS.addEntry({ title: ””, url: ”” });

  • Sailor Ripley commented on the blog post Did Rick Barnes use a plant last night to distract KU players?   ago

    We commented on the lass during telecast. Thanks for, getting this up, so to speak.

    SHARETHIS.addEntry({ title: ””, url: ”” });

  • skymonkeyhorn commented on the blog post Texas Hoops vs. Kansas: Post-Mortem   5 minutes ago

    EP, careful those word will get you a rebuke from Peter Pan. Those words should not be heard until March if we are disappointed by this talented team. Lets wait until the season is a complete train wreck then lets file a legal brief that is in lawyeris to explain what a fuck up season

  • Mister Mike commented on the blog post Recruiting the Trenches   6 minutes ago

    Sailor’s sponsoring it? Holy shit…that likely means goats, togas, and lots of cheap wine.

    Welcome to the network!

    SHARETHIS.addEntry({ title: ””, url: ”” });

  • Trips Right commented on the blog post Texas Hoops vs. Kansas: Post-Mortem   9 minutes ago

    Bates, thanks man. That means a lot.

  • skymonkeyhorn commented on the blog post Texas Hoops vs. Kansas: Post-Mortem   34 minutes ago

    Yeah your right, penders teams were at least fun to watch play. Barnes offense is pretty bad not as bad as Tom’s but its all relative to who is watching the worst offense in Texas history.

    “His teams did not play D, did not box out, and were generally unsound in the fundamentals of the game.”
    Close

  • czarcw commented on the blog post Texas Hoops vs. Kansas: Post-Mortem   36 minutes ago

    Our hoops team is the basketball version of Major League.

    Jake Taylor = Damion James
    Pedro Cerrano = Dexter Pittman
    Willie Mays Hays = Avery Bradley
    Roger Dorn = Justin Mason
    Isuro Tanaka (Major League II) = Dogus Balbay
    Rube Baker (Major Leauge II) = Jordan Hamilton

    If Craig Way starts drinking whiskey during the broadcasts, it’ll complete the analogy.

  • Farmer Ted commented on the blog post Recruiting the Trenches   38 minutes ago

    Nice job with this – and welcome to the network, on behalf of Better Off Red. See you at the Fantake retreat in Vegas that Sailor Ripley is sponsoring this summer!

    SHARETHIS.addEntry({ title: ””, url: ”” });

  • J Rog commented on the blog post Game Day: Spurs vs. Lakers Open Thread   42 minutes ago

    Fell apart in the fourth quarter again. Can’t give up 28 points to close out a game. Spurs, Longhorns….heartache once again.

    SHARETHIS.addEntry({ title: ””, url: ”” });

  • Farmer Ted commented on the blog post Thoughts on the win in Austin   45 minutes ago

    Nice job Hiphop. Very nice to win what is probably the toughest game on the schedule handily, although the Hawks obviously caught UT at a good time.

    The Morningstar FT was terrible and hilarious. He said the ball was wet, which clearly means Texas was cheating somehow. Would the second chance off balance leaner

    SHARETHIS.addEntry({ title: ””, url: ”” });

  • Nickel Rover commented on the blog post Another night, another would-be hero   46 minutes ago

    I don’t think McCoy played anywhere near the level of Suh and the numbers make it clear that he did not. Suh had twice as many tackles (77-31), sacks (11-5) and nearly tackles for loss (22-14.5). Suh also broke up 10 passes, if he gets stonewalled on the rush he doesn’t allow it to take

  • skymonkeyhorn commented on the blog post Texas Hoops vs. Kansas: Post-Mortem   47 minutes ago

    We are bound to the past no matter how great the past is, we are bound to fail if we do not look to the future.
    The End

  • J Rog wrote a new blog post: Missed Opportunities: Spurs vs. Lakers Recap   53 minutes ago

    Whiskey. Tango. Foxtrot.  This game was served up on a silver platter for the Spurs and they managed to fumble it like a Minnesota Viking in the playoffs. 

    I think perhaps Will Ferrell can describe my emotions on the current state of the Spurs season better than I. 

     

    The Spurs hung around for most of the

    SHARETHIS.addEntry({ title: ””, url: ”” });

  • slugfest commented on the blog post Texas Hoops vs. Kansas: Post-Mortem   56 minutes ago

    EP, I get your point, but I don’t think the fact that Texas hasn’t won a tourney came as an underdog doesn’t support it. Teams are favored because they are better. The odds that they win are greater than those who are not favored. It’s not like Texas goes into games with a secret weapon

  • Mister Mike commented on the blog post Did Rick Barnes use a plant last night to distract KU players?   1 hour ago

    I think KU should demand an immediate investigation. Find someone to get to the bottom of this.

    I volunteer myself.

    SHARETHIS.addEntry({ title: ””, url: ”” });

  • Trips Right commented on the blog post Top 8 Teams in College Hoops   1 hour, 4 minutes ago

    Georgetown?

  • RRR commented on the blog post Thoughts on the win in Austin   1 hour, 4 minutes ago

    Good write up, hiphop. I love the versatitility of the Morris twins on defense. Xavier Henry is probably the key to a big run in the tournament. If he starts hitting open looks, the inside game will really open up. Post to post passing is fun to watch.

    It’s pretty nice when

    SHARETHIS.addEntry({ title: ””, url: ”” });

  • Trips Right commented on the blog post Texas Hoops vs. Kansas: Post-Mortem   1 hour, 7 minutes ago

    PB, just talking. I’m not ready to replace him but something has to change. The comment about playing 3 on 5 three quarters into the season is just astoundingly bad.

  • Blake Stansbery commented on the blog post Petrino Building Fence Around Arkansas   1 hour, 16 minutes ago

    Here is more info on Frazier. He is such a great player, and Arkansas needs to land him in a big way.

    http://www.kiehlfrazier15.com/Home.html

    http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ow1mOrMQXYw

    These Highlights are from his Sophomore year, and he had a bigger and better 2009. OH MY!

  • Blake Stansbery commented on the blog post Petrino Building Fence Around Arkansas   1 hour, 16 minutes ago

    Here is more info on Frazier. He is such a great player, and Arkansas needs to land him in a big way.

    http://www.kiehlfrazier15.com/Home.html

    http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ow1mOrMQXYw

    These Highlights are from his Sophomore year, and he had a bigger and better 2009. OH MY!

  • Blake Stansbery commented on the blog post Petrino Building Fence Around Arkansas   1 hour, 16 minutes ago

    Here is more info on Frazier. He is such a great player, and Arkansas needs to land him in a big way.

    http://www.kiehlfrazier15.com/Home.html

    These Highlights are from his Sophomore year, and he had a bigger and better 2009. OH MY!

  • Trips Right commented on the blog post Texas Hoops vs. Kansas: Post-Mortem   1 hour, 19 minutes ago

    It takes more time…unless you’re a Kentucky fan.

  • RRR commented on the blog post Mid-Season Thoughts and OU Pre-Game   1 hour, 20 minutes ago

    Thanks Trips. I’m hoping for lots of Willie Warren trying to be Sheron Collins. TMG in sync is the scariest thing to face in Norman. That or we get beat up on the boards which seems to be recurring theme of Texas Tech road games.

    SHARETHIS.addEntry({ title: ””, url: ”” });

  • slugfest commented on the blog post Texas Hoops vs. Kansas: Post-Mortem   1 hour, 21 minutes ago

    I don’t think it’s a case of RB not being able to coach, or doing a poor job of coaching. If you read the entirety of Katz’ blog post, he clearly sounds like a coaching searching for answers — answers that come in the form of players contributing, doing what they are coached to do.

  • Blake Stansbery commented on the blog post John Pelphrey’s Unconventional Approach   1 hour, 29 minutes ago

    I agree that an NIT bid would be acceptable this year, but that if the Razorbacks can get to 20 wins they will have a very good chance at the NCAA Tourney.

    Our RPI is bad, and we have no signature wins.

    However, we have 8 games left on the SEC regular season schedule. If we

  • Blake Stansbery commented on the blog post John Pelphrey’s Unconventional Approach   1 hour, 29 minutes ago

    I agree that an NIT bid would be acceptable this year, but that if the Razorbacks can get to 20 wins they will have a very good chance at the NCAA Tourney.

    Our RPI is bad, and we have no signature wins.

    However, we have 8 games left on the SEC regular season schedule. If we

  • Blake Stansbery commented on the blog post Recruiting the Trenches   1 hour, 33 minutes ago

    TP welcome to the network.

    I like how you broke this down, and identified which positions history shows a high star ranking has proven to be important. I personally feel that after what all the recruiting sites dub their top players that there is a major falloff. We all love that the recruiting sites bring

    SHARETHIS.addEntry({ title: ””, url: ”” });

  • Art Vandelay commented on the blog post Texas Hoops vs. Kansas: Post-Mortem   1 hour, 33 minutes ago

    Groundhog Day said:
    February 9th, 2010 at 10:00 am

    “How can everyone on the team have worse basketball sense than my 5th graders? Honestly? We are the dumbest bunch I have ever seen. We weren’t earlier in the year. Hell, Bradley was smartest player, by far, in any of the summer h.s. games. Now he plays

  • Farmer Ted commented on the blog post Petrino Building Fence Around Arkansas   1 hour, 36 minutes ago

    Good stuff JA. But the Huskers call dibs on any dual threat QB named Frazier thankyouverymuch.

  • Hiphopopotamus commented on the blog post Did Rick Barnes use a plant last night to distract KU players?   1 hour, 38 minutes ago

    I’m convinced.

    SHARETHIS.addEntry({ title: ””, url: ”” });